|
Makale Özeti:
|
Hermeneutiğe, yöntemsel olarak farklı bir açıklama getirmek amacında olmayan Gadamer’in en çok eleştirilen yönü, belki de kullandığı provokatif kavramlardır. Kullandığı “önyargı”, “gelenek” ve “otorite” gibi kavramların provokatifliğini kabul eden Gadamer’in bu tür kavramları tercih etmesinin yine de felsefi dayanakları vardır. Anlayan ‘ben’in ve anlaşılan şeyin tarih tarafından etkilendiğini ifade eden “etki tarihi ilkesi” ve anlamanın ön-koşulluluğuna vurgu yapan “hermeneutik daire” fikri, Gadamer’in söz konusu bu dayanaklarıdır. Bu nedenle Gadamer’in etki tarihi ilkesini ve hermeneutik daire fikrini provoke ettiğini iddia etmek yanlış olmayacaktır. Ama bu noktada onun bu provokatifliği neye karşı gerçekleştirdiği sorusu akla gelir. Bu soruya verilecek yanıt, Gadamer'in provokatifliğini açıklayıcı nitelikte olacaktır. Bu çalışmada, Gadamer'in etki tarihi ilkesi ve hermeneutik daire fikrini ne bakımdan ve söz konusu kavramlara nasıl anlamlar yükleyerek, neye karşı provokatörlük yaptığına açıklık getirilmeye çalışılmıştır.
|
|
Alternatif Dilde Özet:
|
In this paper, I am focusing on such concepts of 'tradition', 'prejudice' and 'authority', and discussing some reasons and consequences provocative concepts of Gadamer's who is a significant philosopher for hermeneutics in this century. For discussing his provocative concepts I will try to reply such a question: Are these concepts provocative or not in itself which conduced to point the finger at Gadamer by the conservatism and the dogmatism. My investigation will begin with indicating to Gadamer's intent on a common thing in whole understanding, is required an account for his 'principle of history of effect'. This undeniable principle as methodological is discovers that the understanding interacts with the historical effects of 'the thing understood' rather than itself. Therefore, this paper grounds on that the concept of ‘prejudice’ indicates effects of history on 'the person understanding’, at the same time 'tradition' and 'authority' are indicates same effects on 'the thing understood'. / In the next phase of the paper, I examine Gadamer's concept of 'horizon' for justification of this ground. This concept that make problematic to Dilthey's mode of understanding is expresses effects of history on the both of 'the person understanding' and 'the thing understood'. Gadamer's mode of understanding conceptualized as ‘the fusion of horizons' is required a historical distance between 'the person understanding' and 'the thing understood'. This requirement comes forward in the process of understanding for them. The paper is focused on pre-conditions of understanding such as the idea of 'hermeneutical circle', so that I refer to effects of Schleiermacher and Heidegger on Gadamer. I argue that Gadamer's provocative concepts depend on ontological hermeneutics of Heidegger's who ontologically indicated the consequences of 'hermeneutic circle' rather than Dilthey's philosophy of life. For this relation, I assert that the meaning, for Gadamer, is not a thing being there for us but is a possibility revealed according to interests of Dasein. / At this point the important thing for Gadamer who offered as a process of reflection this possibility is being alert to the context of meaning belongs to 'the thing understood'. This context indicates to his own truth against the pre-understanding conditions of 'the person understanding'. According to Gadamer, the understanding has pre-conditions is required a position that can change with respect to this context rather than remains stabile. The dialogical mode of hermeneutical understanding is constructed on both sides of the dialog have own self. Gadamer's formulation of understanding is nothing aside from a determination of perceptivity which made with the arguable concepts. Perceptivity demonstrates that the consciousness has effected by history since it's required arguments belongs to the consciousness formerly. Using concept of 'prejudice' and 'tradition', Gadamer, formulates this case. For Gadamer, the illumination of these arguments by consciousness itself is not a separation from tradition. Uttering this illumination as a necessity, Gadamer tries to struggle with negative connotations on such concepts especially on 'prejudice'. I refer to this attempt of Gadamer at this stage. / Gadamer purposes to ascribe a positive meaning to the thesis that “our being constituted by our prejudices rather than judgments”. For that purpose, Gadamer has mentioned some terminological using of 'prejudice'. Naturally, there is an acceptance such as “prejudice can not contain negativity imposed on it formerly”, on the back of this attempt of Gadamer who accepted that his thesis is provoking. In this paper, for having a ground to this acceptance, I deal with the using and differences of 'prejudice' on Latin language and exhibit relation between these differences and Enlightenment. Perhaps, one consequence of this discussing will be the aim of historical-critical hermeneutics is not ignore but approve to 'prejudices' obstructed the understanding. However, this approving as an illumination is not to just 'prejudice' and 'tradition' but also to a historical consciousness. The case must be retain in mind is that the aim of historical-critical hermeneutics called 'philosophical hermeneutics' by Gadamer, is overcoming to hidden prejudices obstructed understanding not all prejudices. / I compose the end of the paper according to why the historicity of being constructed by prejudices rather than judgments? In this part of the paper, firstly, I compare with Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and Enlightenment in the context of 'tradition', 'authority' and 'reason'. This comparison proves that there is not an essential disagreement between hermeneutics and Enlightenment since hermeneutical critics of religion precipitated to Enlightenment. Nevertheless, the hermeneutical critics of religion should not be comprehended as a whole refusing of 'authority' and 'tradition'. According to Gadamer, Enlightenmental dualisms such as reason-authority and freedom-tradition are one consequences of blindness, because the essence of 'tradition' and 'authority' is not that. Authority is not a slavishly dependence or leaving of reason but a reasonable resignation. This meaning of ‘authority’ also gets a definition to the concept of 'tradition' itself. 'Tradition' is always transposed to today by uniting old and new on a common ground, so that 'tradition' is not stabile in the past. / In the last part of the paper, I have an answer to my essential question in the light of these conceptual solutions. The consequence, I have reached, is Gadamer's controversial concepts are provocative interpretations of Dilthey and Heidegger. At this point, it's come forward that Gadamer provocates 'the principle of history of effect' and the idea of 'hermeneutical circle' with using concepts of 'prejudice' and 'tradition' against what? I have answered this question from two aspects. The first answer is Gadamer, using 'prejudice', provocates scientific opinion that designed a person as who can get out of effects of history. He determined the historical position of 'the thing understood' as a thing conveyed to now rather than a thing stayed stabile in the past. This is other part of provocation of Gadamer. Also using this concept, Gadamer provocates opinion that 'the thing understood' is historically stayed in the past. These opinions that provocated according to historical position of the both of 'the person understanding' and 'the thing understood', are philosophically depend on Dilthey even though they have roots from the before of Dilthey. Gadamer claims that the person who carry historical conditions in his own existence as prejudices can not get out of these conditions. For this reason, by this claim, Gadamer provocates whole tradition of Enlightenment and naturally scientifical thoughts. In this way, it is clarified that Gadamer's concepts are not provocative in themselves and that provocation of them must be argued with the answer given to question of what Gadamer provocates these concepts against what.
|